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Strengths and limitations of this study
 ► This study uniquely explores initial efforts of service 
managers and frontline health-workers to respond 
to and mitigate the targeting and besiegement of 
their health facilities during the ongoing conflict in 
Syria.
 ► Two co-authors are Syrian health-workers who have 
provided health services in opposition-controlled 
Syria and have first-hand understanding of the chal-
lenges facing Syria’s frontline health professionals.
 ► Due to limited empirical research on frontline 
health-worker experiences in Syria, findings have 
implications for the global humanitarian commu-
nity to provide greater support to frontline Syrian 
health professionals, through appropriate supplies 
and training and helping to end the targeting and 
besiegement that violate international humanitarian 
law.
 ► This is an exploratory study of a small sample of 
health-workers working in opposition-controlled re-
gions of Syria.
AbStrACt
Objectives To explore health-worker perspectives 
on security, improving safety, managing constrained 
resources and handling mass casualties during 
besiegement in Syria.
Design A qualitative study using semi-structured key 
informant interviews, conducted remotely over WhatsApp 
and Skype, and analysed thematically using inductive 
coding.
Setting Secondary and tertiary health facilities affected 
by besiegement in Aleppo (from July to December 2016) 
and Rural Damascus (from August 2013 to February 
2018).
Participants Twenty-one male Syrian health-workers 
and service-users who had experienced besiegement and 
targeting of their health facilities.
results Participants described four related challenges of: 
(i) conflict-related responses, particularly responding to 
mass casualties; (ii) targeted attack responses, particularly 
preventing/surviving facility bombings; (iii) besiegement 
responses, particularly mitigating severe resource 
constraints; and (iv) chronic risk responses, particularly 
maintaining emotional resilience. Mass casualty response 
involved triage and training to prioritise mortality reduction 
and available resources, for example those with greatest 
need and likelihood of survival. Targeting response 
was largely physical, including fortification, working 
underground, reducing visibility and services dispersal. 
Besiegement response required resource conservation, for 
example, controlling consumption, reusing consumables, 
low-technology equipment, finding alternative supply 
routes, stockpiling and strengthening available human 
resources through online trainings and establishing 
a medical school in Ghouta. Risk responses included 
managing safety worries, finding value in work and 
maintaining hope.
Conclusion Besieged health-workers were most affected 
by severe resource constraints and safety concerns 
while responding to overwhelming mass casualty events. 
Lessons for targeting/besiegement planning include 
training staff and preparing for: (i) mass casualties, 
through local/online health-worker training in triage, 
emergency response and resource conservation; allowing 
task-shifting; and providing access to low-technology 
equipment; (ii) attacks, through strengthened facility 
security, for example, protection and deterrence through 
fortification, working underground and reducing visibility; 
and (iii) besiegement, through ensuring access to internet, 
electricity and low-technology/reusable equipment; 
securely stockpiling fuel, medicines and supplies; and 
establishing alternative supply routes.
IntrODuCtIOn
Syria is a lower-middle income country, with 
a population of over 23 million in 2004,1 2 
reduced to an estimated 16.9million in 2018.3 
The Syrian revolution began in March 
2011, as security forces arresting teenagers 
in Daraa for painting anti-President Assad 
slogans on school walls triggered nationwide 
protests.4 Protests against the government, 
for perceived lack of freedoms and authori-
tarianism, were responded to forcefully5 with 
many reported detained, killed or tortured.6 
Civilians began arming themselves4 and 
violence spread, creating a massive human-
itarian crisis. The Syrian conflict enters its 
eighth year with an unknown number dead 
(364 792 deaths documented7), 6.3 million 
internally displaced and 6 million refugees in 
neighbouring countries.8
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Figure 1 Besieged communities in Syria, November 2016. Source: UNOCHA. Besieged communities, as of November 2016. 
https://reliefweb.int/map/syrian-arab-republic/syrian-arab-republic-besieged-communities-18-november-2016.
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions obliged ratifying 
states to refrain from violence against those people 
not participating in combat.9 Ratified by 196 countries, 
including Syria, they require all parties to protect and 
ensure safety of health facilities, personnel, wounded civil-
ians and wounded combatants.10 Attacks on healthcare 
have been reported in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone,11 12 but have been 
‘exceptionally egregious’ in Syria.13 14 For example, Physi-
cians for Human Rights reported at least 542 attacks on 
348 health facilities between March 2011 and September 
2018,15 490 committed by the Syrian Government and its 
allies.16 In the first half of 2017, at least 36 attacks against 
healthcare were verified.17 Aleppo governorate alone 
experienced attacks against 63% of its hospitals.18–20 Since 
attacks happened in rapid succession and increased with 
military operations in opposition-controlled areas, many 
actors considered health facility attacks as deliberate 
targeting.14 21
‘Siege’ is defined as ‘a military operation in which 
enemy forces surround a town or building, cutting off 
essential supplies, with the aim of compelling those 
inside to surrender’.22 This ‘kneel or starve’ strategy 
was used to force communities in opposition-controlled 
areas to surrender,23 and primarily used by pro-govern-
ment forces in Syria.24 The United Nations Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) 
defines besieged areas in Syria as: ‘surrounded by armed 
actors with the sustained effect that humanitarian assis-
tance cannot regularly enter, and civilians, the sick and 
wounded cannot regularly exit…’. In November 2016, 
UNOCHA recognised approximately 0.97 million people 
in besieged areas (figure 1) and 3.9 million in hard-
to-reach areas. The Syrian Government and its allies 
were responsible for approximately 88% of community 
besiegement, among approximately 880 000 Syrians expe-
riencing siege, while 10% were besieged by other armed 
groups and 2% by opposition groups.24
Aleppo and Ghouta both experienced siege. Aleppo is 
Syria’s largest city and capital of its most-populated gover-
norate.2 25 Battles for its control continued from 2012 until 
December 2016, when pro-government forces reclaimed 
control over the whole city.26–36 Rural Damascus, with an 
estimated pre-conflict population of two million,25 37 38 
hosted some of the strongest and earliest anti-govern-
ment protests in Ghouta.37 The Eastern Aleppo siege 
was characterised by an acute and heavy military offen-
sive (July–December 2016), while the siege of Ghouta 
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(2013–2018) was protracted with relatively less intensive 
military activity.
Health facility attacks and besiegement have severely 
damaged the Syrian health system. Médecins Sans Fron-
tières reported the insecure conditions within which 
Syrian health-workers operated, including lack of human 
resources, hospital beds, fuel and medicines.39 This 
contributed to disease outbreaks (eg, polio40), dangerous 
shortages of qualified health-workers—particularly 
doctors,13 16 and remaining facilities overloaded with 
injured patients. Women increasingly chose caesarean 
sections to control time and location of delivery, while 
elective healthcare dropped severely. The World Bank and 
others highlighted that most deaths in Syria were caused 
by health system breakdown rather than fighting.40
This study aimed to explore experiences and coping 
strategies of health-workers and service-users during the 
sieges of Aleppo (June-December 2016) and Ghouta 
(2013–2018). Objectives were to: (i) identify strategies 
used to mitigate healthcare besiegement and lack of 
resources; and (ii) examine their experiences and percep-
tions of these challenges during acute and protracted 
sieges.
MethODS
Study design and sampling
We selected a qualitative study design, using semi-struc-
tured key informant interviews with health-workers and 
service-users who experienced siege in Aleppo in 2016 or 
Ghouta in 2013–2017. The primary research question was: 
‘What are the main challenges and adaptive approaches 
for administrators and frontline health-workers in 
besieged and targeted health facilities in Syria?’
We initially used purposive sampling, to include partic-
ipants who provided healthcare, or had sought health-
care, in a besieged area with no access to aid either by 
land or air routes. Recruitment was challenged by confi-
dentiality and safety concerns, limited electricity/internet 
access and time constraints. Personal contacts were thus 
snowballed using WhatsApp and Skype, with each recom-
mending 2–3 other potential participants, to increase 
trust and willingness to participate. Interviewers were 
male Syrian health professionals, trained in qualitative 
methods, and conducting research as part of their MSc 
studies. Thus, positioning and reflexivity influenced inter-
viewing and analysis. Identifying the common connection 
who recommended the interviewee increased comfort 
with participating. While we did not ask for participants’ 
names, many disclosed this and details of their job as they 
indicated their names were already known on media, 
while others used code names. Participants viewed the 
research and interviewer role differently. Prior to the 
interviews, many questioned the nature of interviews, the 
organisation interviewers belonged to and whether they 
were journalists. However, most indicated participation 
might raise awareness of their situation and potentially 
help others. One refused to participate, as he had already 
‘talked a lot, but all in vain’, suggesting frustration at the 
international community’s lack of response.
Data collection and analysis
We developed two topic guides to examine health-worker 
and service-user perceptions and experiences, based on 
personal experience in Syria, expert consultation and 
the literature.24 39 41–43 Guides were piloted prior to use. 
Topics included maintaining security, resource manage-
ment and practice adaptations. NF and YD conducted 
semi-structured interviews in Syrian Arabic, recorded 
them using Windows audio recorder, then transcribed/
translated and transferred transcripts to Nvivo V.9 for 
analysis with field notes used for triangulation. We 
continued interviews until no new themes emerged. We 
used WhatsApp or Skype call functions as face-to-face 
and phone interviews were prohibitively difficult in oppo-
sition-controlled areas. We recorded written and verbal 
informed consent before interviews. We sent partici-
pants electronic copies of information sheet and consent 
forms, with questions answered before interviews. Partic-
ipants used mobile phones to photograph and send 
signed consent forms. Given security concerns, interviews 
were recorded anonymously using identification codes. 
Where possible, participants were sent their anonymised 
transcripts via encrypted institutional emails for further 
comment/correction, and were asked for feedback on 
initial themes. Recordings and transcripts were stored in 
password-protected files.
NF and YD analysed data thematically in Arabic, using 
inductive coding according to Braun and Clarke’s six 
steps.44 45 Each coded half of total transcripts and shared 
analysis, with NH checking consistency of coding and 
analysis. Analysis began during data collection, to help 
determine when saturation was reached. To minimise loss 
through translation, only codes, themes and quotes were 
double-translated into English by two bilingual speakers 
to improve reliability. Codes and themes were reviewed by 
NH and discrepancies agreed between authors. Reporting 
adheres to the Consolidated Criteria for Reporting Qual-
itative research (COREQ).45
ethics
No formal ethics committee or internationally recognised 
government institutions operated in opposition-con-
trolled areas in Syria at the time of research. Research 
conforms to Declaration of Helsinki principles.
Patient and public involvement
No patients or members of the public were involved in 
conducting this research.
reSultS
Participant characteristics and themes
Table 1 shows 21 participating health-workers and service-
users (ie, 10 in Aleppo, 5 in Rural Damascus, and 6 in 
other high-risk opposition-controlled districts affected by 
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Table 1 Participant characteristics
Code Category Location Interview
AA1 Administrator Aleppo Whatsapp
SA2 Surgeon Aleppo Whatsapp
PA3 Pharmacist Aleppo Whatsapp
NA4 Neuro resident Aleppo Whatsapp
EA5 Emergency doctor Aleppo Whatsapp
RA6 Nurse Aleppo Whatsapp
DA7 Dentist Aleppo Whatsapp
TA8 Doctor assistant Aleppo Whatsapp
HD5 Health directorate 
staff
Aleppo Skype
SU1 Service-user Aleppo Skype
MG1 Medical student Ghouta/Rural 
Damascus
Whatsapp
MG2 Medical student Ghouta/Rural 
Damascus
Whatsapp
SG3 Surgeon Ghouta/Rural 
Damascus
Whatsapp
HD4 Health directorate 
staff
Ghouta/Rural 
Damascus
Skype
SU4 Service-user Ghouta/Rural 
Damascus
Whatsapp
HD1 Health directorate 
staff
Idleb Whatsapp
HD2 Health directorate 
staff
Hama Whatsapp
HD3 Health directorate 
staff
Dara’a Whatsapp
SU2 Service-user Idleb Whatsapp
SU3 Service-user Dara’a Whatsapp
SU5 Service-user Hama Whatsapp
aspects of besiegement), interviewed during 2016–2017, 
who had experienced health facility targeting and/or 
besiegement.
Table 2 shows results framed under four overarching 
themes of: (i) conflict-related responses, particularly to 
mass casualties; (ii) targeted attack responses, particularly 
to facility bombings; (iii) besiegement responses, partic-
ularly to severe resource constraints; and (iv) perceived 
risk responses, particularly to stress and safety concerns.
Conflict-related responses
Severe security and resource restrictions—particularly 
influxes of mass casualties—required altering treatment 
standards to prioritise mortality reduction over service 
quality, including triage, sterilisation, transfusion and 
X-rays.
The quality of services are bad […] there is absence 
of basic needs in field hospitals […] However, consid-
ering the support they receive, I would say […service 
quality] is excellent. SU3
Triage
The triage process was new to most, as only emergency 
doctors were trained to use it prior to the conflict, and 
participants were quick to note its value for all health-
workers faced with the new reality of frequent mass casu-
alty events.
Sometimes, within half an hour, hospitals receive 
500–1000 injured people SU4
Participants described the benefits of the triage process 
in mitigating the stresses and ethical quandaries of prior-
itising evacuation of casualties from strike zones to field 
hospitals via ambulance, emergency department triage, 
transfer for surgery or other response and moving to 
recovery/care units outside the field hospital for defini-
tive care. The large numbers of injured people reaching 
facilities after an air strike rapidly exhausted health-
workers and resources, and triage prioritised those at 
greatest need and also most likely to survive.
Within minutes, you have to have already made your 
decision. Quick look at each patient and quick pri-
mary assessment of their case. Some would go to op-
eration room, others would be taken to the isolation 
room [black card room], another patient would be 
ignored who is talking loudly and has good vital signs. 
EA5
Triage helped health-workers deal with the ethical issues 
around rationing care for desperate patients given the 
lack of sufficient resources and skills. Operating theatre 
beds were very limited, especially during mass casualty 
events, requiring rigorous injury prioritisation.
The biggest hospital had 4 operation beds. You have 
30–40 injuries. They would give orders to let only 
those more likely to survive in operating theatres. 
DA7
Non-urgent cases received first-aid to stabilise their 
injuries and were asked to wait, sometimes for more than 
a day.
My hand was injured and fractured by shelling shrap-
nel […] I had to give first-aid to myself…. When I 
went to the hospital, they gave me painkillers, cooled 
down my situation, and sent me home […]. There 
were hundreds of injured people, […the doctors] 
were too busy with other injuries …. I had to come 
the following day to take an x-ray of my hand. SU4
Patients with poor prognoses, for example, loss of 
cerebral material or pelvic bones, were separated out. 
All participants expressed remorse at this practice, but 
stressed this was the only way to handle such high demand 
versus low supply.
Especially in the case of massacres, we would have to 
take only patients whose situation needed interven-
tion and there was a likely benefit of intervening, 
meaning not the patients with the ‘black card’. We 
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Table 2 Themes, challenges and mitigation approaches
Themes Primary challenges Management/mitigation approaches
Conflict  ► Extensive/indiscriminate weapons use against 
civilians resulting in overwhelming numbers of 
injuries.
 ► Triage; deciding whose injury could benefit the most 
from sparse supplies and time.
 ► Coordinating with other hospitals to refer casualties via 
social media.
Targeting  ► Targeted bombing of facilities requiring 
protection for health-worker, patients and assets.
 ► Extensive weapons use against civilians raising 
constant concerns for family safety.
 ► Working in basement levels and using tunnels for 
access.
 ► Fortifying and hiding facilities.
 ► Decentralising facilities and patients.
 ► Sleeping at facilities.
Besiegement  ► Severe human resource shortages.  ► Telemedicine.
 ► Task shifting to junior health-workers and medical 
students.
 ► Working across medical specialties.
 ► Building capacities through training.
 ► Severe medical consumables shortages.
 ► Medicines and pharmaceuticals shortages.
 ► Severe fuel and electricity shortages.
 ► Smugglers brought some medical supplies.
 ► Sterilising and reusing disposable medical 
consumables.
 ► Making blood bags and serums.
 ► Using manual devices whenever possible instead of 
electric devices.
 ► Using energy from ‘home-made’ fuel, solar power, 
rechargeable batteries and lid lights.
Chronic risk  ► Severe physical risk to health-workers and their 
families.
 ► Long chaotic hours in very difficult conditions.
 ► Feeling valued and working as part of a team.
 ► Finding small joys in life and ways to maintain hope.
categorised black-card patients, those who were un-
likely to survive […] Even if the patient were breath-
ing, this would be dying breathing. EA5
Sterilisation, X-rays and transfusion
To manage frequent mass casualty events, universal 
precautions and transfusion standards were relaxed to 
rely on clinical judgement. Surgeons often had to move 
between patients without thoroughly sterilising oper-
ating theatres. Participants relied on chemical antiseptics 
instead of standard sterilising measures for instruments 
and consumables. Surgical instruments were sterilised 
using Cidex solution instead of autoclave or dry sterili-
sation and doctors would sometimes wipe patients with 
povidone-wetted cloths.
When the injury is life threatening, you would never 
consider sterile conditions. Your duty is to save a life, 
so it is possible to exceed some [red] lines. SA2
Doctors reported echography as a good alternative to 
X-ray imaging, as it was more efficient and faster for some 
injuries, although accuracy was compromised.
Blood transfusion was done with blood typing but 
without cross-matching, potentially causing some haemo-
lysis cases. Due to insufficient supplies, blood was only 
transfused to patients until their haemoglobin concen-
tration reached above 80 g/L. The demand for blood 
donation was significant. Donation reportedly reduced in 
Aleppo, as many had donated multiple times.
We would provide blood until patient’s haemoglobin 
reached 8 [g/dl]. It is not necessary to be 10 [g/dl], 
because those who remained during the siege had 
donated 4–5 times until we could not find any donor. 
NA4
Donation remained more stable in Ghouta, though 
service-users indicated that poor and insufficient nutri-
tion reduced the speed at which they could recover from 
blood donations or injuries.
I know cases of 18 months and 20 months old frac-
tures and have not healed yet. This is related to lack 
of quantity and quality of food SU4
Facility targeting and protective responses
Participants reported health facilities being targeted by 
air strikes. The four main protective responses partici-
pants described were working underground, fortifying 
facilities, reducing visibility and dispersion.
Working underground
Participants reported that working in basement levels 
protected health-workers and patients from air strikes. 
Similarly, warehouses were maintained in underground 
levels to secure commodities during bombardment. 
Hospitals with more underground levels reportedly 
survived longer.
Many times while we were working, the hospital would 
be bombarded. The operation theatre door would 
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come off or the windows would fell on us, but the 
[main] thing was that we worked in the lower levels, 
in the basement level or even lower and the building 
above us was 4 or 5 floors at least […] All field hospi-
tals should work underground. NA4
However, participants noted that during chemical 
attacks, for example, chlorine gas, working underground 
could increase the risk of injuries and fatalities because 
gases tended to settle and become more concentrated 
unless dispersed by air movements.46 47
Fortifying facilities
Some participants recommended fortification to prevent 
fragments and shrapnel injuring health-workers and 
patients. Sandbags were the main fortification units, or 
rubble-filled bags when sand was not available. Fortifica-
tion was used for assets, for example, electricity genera-
tors and oxygen concentrators, which could be located in 
secured locations outside facilities. Security guards were 
identified as necessary to manage people accompanying 
patients, particularly when admittance was delayed due to 
lack of available places.
Managing those who come to the hospital with the 
patients helps to protect health-workers. So, there 
should be [security personnel] for the hospital in 
case someone, out of emotion and worries about a 
patient, bullied the health-worker NA4
While some described building fortification as crucial, 
others indicated that it could increase risk by making the 
facility more identifiable by scout aircraft. Some argued 
that because attacks were deliberate and fortification 
could not protect against advanced weaponry, fortifica-
tion could make aircraft targeting easier.
Fortification proved ineffective, especially, as […] 
the other side had no deterrent law or ethic, nothing 
to prevent them. So if you fortified the hospital you 
would be giving them a landmark, as no fortification 
would resist bunker buster bombs […] especially bar-
rel bombs, because this weapon is indiscriminate and 
depends on the sight vision of the pilot or the person 
who would throw the barrel […] It was better for the 
buildings to be indistinct, distributed, hidden or un-
derground. EA5
Reducing visibility
Participants reported turning off facade lighting and 
reducing signage to reduce facility visibility from air 
strikes. Ambulances were parked away from facilities and 
patients transported through tunnels. Media interest had 
to be managed carefully, as reporting could increase visi-
bility and thus risk of air strikes. If a facility was bombed, 
journalists were asked not to report its name or location 
as this could be used to organise future attacks.
It is necessary to avoid the media taping and hide the 
hospital name. For example, Sakhour Hospital was 
attacked. When it was filmed and (the reporter) said 
the hospital had not been hit, the regime attacked 
another time… NA4
Dispersing facilities
Ghouta health-workers created a ‘dispersed’ hospital, 
with every unit (eg, departments, vaccination centres) 
located in a different part of the city, to minimise loss 
of health-workers and assets during air strikes and avoid 
large numbers queuing around any facility.
We created several vaccination centres and did not 
locate them in one place. We turned the clinical cen-
tres into vaccination centres. SG3
Patients’ families and friends could pose direct and 
indirect risks. First, those escorting a patient to hospital, 
especially if armed, could react violently if their patient 
was not prioritised. To mitigate this, some participants 
reported using security guards. Second, people gathering 
around the hospital made it more visible to scout aircraft. 
Ghouta participants stated that the best way to increase 
patient safety was to keep them outside after surgery in 
external recovery points. These distant points, prefer-
ably located underground for security, replaced hospital 
recovery rooms.
Recovery points included big number of patients up 
to 100–200 persons per one point, their existence was 
not seen. EA5
Additional approaches
Two health-workers reported some non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) providing helpful security train-
ings before the siege, for example, on maintaining 
their safety, managing chemical attacks. Participants 
suggested additional trainings would be useful, in-person 
or via skype, on triage, war injuries management, war-re-
lated trauma treatment, stabilising injuries and damage 
control. Other protective practices included staying over-
night at the hospital to avoid dangerous commutes, and 
WhatsApp group communication between hospitals and 
with ambulances to avoid taking the injured to newly 
targeted hospitals.
besiegement and mitigating resource constraints
Crucial resources were staff, energy/fuel, internet and 
emergency department supplies. Limitations were 
mitigated through careful administration, staff capac-
ity-building and task-shifting, and consumables stock-
piling, smuggling and local production.
Administration and governance
Field hospitals generally had an administrative manager, 
whose role was to organise work-shifts, communicating 
with other hospitals (eg, referring excess patients or 
updating their status), and logistics (eg, sterilisation and 
cleaning, documentation, food storage, warehousing). 
Social media groups provided a convenient and quick 
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platform for effective communication. However, partic-
ipants reported that strong leadership and governance 
of medical responses were absent. Aleppo hospitals 
followed the Unified Medical Council, which organised 
medical work, but its coordination weakened as the siege 
progressed. Some reported dissatisfaction with leadership 
and coordination efforts. In Ghouta, administrative issues 
included corruption and poor performance.
There was not real coordination and the reason is 
there was not a common management. EA5
Human resources
Qualified health-workers were extremely limited. Some 
participants estimated density of physicians as 1 per 10 
000 people. Participants described limitations across 
many specialties, particularly orthopaedic and neurosur-
geons. Some specialties were totally absent, for example, 
anaesthetists, cardio-surgeons and intensive care unit 
(ICU) technicians.
We had a cardiologist but they killed him. They 
[Syrian regime] hit him with an airstrike, and now we 
no longer have a cardiologist. SU5
Some facilities reported sufficient numbers of nurses. 
As the siege progressed, however, lack of qualified health-
workers overshadowed the lack of facilities.
[Orthopaedics] were there, but their number was 
never sufficient. A lot of patients had to wait for 2–3 
days. There was a lack in neurosurgeons, only one 
neurosurgery resident who was doing what he could, 
a lot of neuro injuries were handled by general sur-
geons. EA5
Mitigation primarily involved capacity-building, through 
shadowing, task-shifting and training. Most participants, 
including non-clinicians, reported working beyond their 
specialist academic training or experience due to the lack 
of qualified health-workers, which required learning from 
other health-workers or external training. For example, 
nurses delivering babies, rather than gynaecologists or 
midwives. Learning from other health-workers was espe-
cially important in Ghouta, as most doctors became expe-
rienced during the long-term siege.
The main benefit came from each other. Every sur-
geon had to attend [an operation] with a doctor from 
different speciality. NA4
Participants reported certain training courses as helpful. 
Surgeons mainly specified courses in ‘war medicine’ and 
‘damage control’, whereas others mentioned safety and 
responding to chemical weapons. Emergency doctors 
took triage courses. A nurse reported studying cardiopul-
monary resuscitation and advanced emergency practice. 
NGOs and foreign clinicians gave in-person trainings in 
Aleppo or Turkey before the siege or via Skype after the 
siege began.
In Ghouta, a medical school was established in 2016 
to train doctors and nurses. It aimed to support medical 
students who had not completed undergraduate training 
because of war. A few senior clinicians provided lectures 
up to third year, after which students had to study on their 
own and take examinations in the school.
The university was [created] due to a big demand 
and we have a lot of hope in it. Our class is 100 stu-
dents. MG1
This school helped reduce the working hours per shift.
From a year and a half on, numbers of [student doc-
tors] increased and shifts became shorter. Regular 
student has a 48 hours shift per week. MG2
Consumables
Participants reported the most crucial supply constraints 
as energy, internet and emergency department supplies.
[There was a] complete absence of serums for a pe-
riod of over 6 months, even blood bags went missing 
for a period of time. Now these things exist but are 
very scarce. SU4
Many participants described the importance of elec-
tricity. Electricity provision was essential for field hospi-
tals to operate. Therefore, having a generator secured 
in a safe place and fuel barrels securely disbursed was 
a priority. Other important assets for protection were 
oxygen concentrators.
Securing a fortified place for fuel and electricity gen-
erator and oxygen generator [was crucial]. Indeed 
there was no regular electricity…we would rely on the 
generator, so if we lost it we could not get a replace-
ment and then electricity is gone. Without it you can’t 
do anything. NA4
Participants reported that electricity was conserved and 
mainly used for operating theatres, oxygen concentrators 
and charging light-emitting diodes (LED) batteries. Partic-
ipants reported manual alternatives were more reliable 
than electric ones (eg, hydraulic operation beds, manual 
oxygen concentrators, anaesthetic devices, battery lid 
lights), as electricity was not stable. Similarly, echography 
was a practical alternative to X-rays as it required less 
consumables and power. Family members were requested 
to oxygenate patients using manual oxygen generators.
Maybe it was a mistake to rely on modern devices or 
electrical ones, because in a severe situation of the 
siege, you had very few hours of electricity, we had to 
do the manual thing […]. Even the simplest things, 
operating tables that had electrical circuits and but-
tons and rely on electricity lost validity, but hydraulic 
tables served us until the very last moment effectively. 
EA5
Most participants agreed on the importance of fuel, 
as otherwise health-worker could not have worked, 
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warehouses could not be kept cool, ambulances and 
other vehicles could not operate.
The most influential supply is fuel because without 
fuel you can’t work. Everything related to oxygen 
generation because oxygen is the nerve [crucial ele-
ment] of surgery and resuscitation… SA2
Fuel consumption was carefully controlled. Aleppo 
health-workers stockpiled large quantities of fuel, so its 
security was the main concern. In contrast, Ghouta health-
workers had to find alternative power sources and only 
use it as absolutely necessary. This included producing 
fuel from plastic or margarine by re-distillation, solar 
power, batteries, LED lights and adapters.
Local fuel has been produced by burning plastic and 
redistilling it… [We use] solar boards and adapters 
from 12 volts to 220 volts through batteries. SG3
Internet connections were essential, as all partici-
pants used WhatsApp or Telegram chat groups for work 
communications. Internet connection helped medical 
teams communicate and coordinate. Communication 
via WhatsApp groups between hospitals helped health-
workers inform each other about their status, exchanging 
information about available specialties, work pressures 
and any attacks. Internet also played a major role in 
contacting people outside besieged areas with status 
updates. Internet access was obtained from towers outside 
the city or via satellite.
Health-worker asserted that medical supplies used in 
emergency departments were most important and care-
fully conserved. Disposable items such as bedsheets and 
gauze were sterilised and reused. Gauze was used to fix 
cannulas to a vein.
There is re-sterilising for example, the pumps that 
are used in ICUs are sterilised, syringes, the gloves… 
We may have to sterilise some blades later if we think 
there is a shortage. SG3
Similarly, thoracentesis was modified from drainage by 
negative pressure to using a urine bag to drain pleural 
fluids. While participants described limited medicines 
and antibiotics, this was generally considered manageable 
as warehouses stockpiled supplies and usage could be 
reduced. Some items were substituted when they ran low.
We would use one substance instead of the other. For 
example, we would use propofol, which we had big 
amount of, instead of isoflourane, [needed for] more 
serious cases. RA6
However, anaesthetic drugs and supplies were required 
for surgery and consumption could not be reduced.
The main problem was anaesthetics. One can deal 
with wounds and reduce the consumption of antibi-
otics, but anaesthetics [consumption] was unavoid-
able. EA5
Stockpiling, smuggling and local production
Aleppo health-worker anticipated a siege and prepared 
by stockpiling consumables and medications that main-
tained them until warehouses were destroyed.
All NGOs were saying there would be a siege on 
Aleppo, so we tended to stockpile supplies, especial-
ly emergency supplies, serums, thoracentesis bulbs, 
catheters and plasters. PA3
Ghouta health-workers required alternatives, as the 
siege continued over 4 years, relying on smugglers and 
tunnels, and local production of some consumables.
The siege was [completely] imposed in middle 2014 
and now we are in 2017, this has been three years 
now. From mid-2014 on, not a single needle entered 
Ghouta. Between middle 2013 and 2014 there were 
smugglers. [However], even tunnels would close at 
certain points. The area from which the tunnel starts 
gets besieged, you need to wait. SG3
Chronic risk perceptions and responses
Participants stressed the primary importance of safety, 
describing strategies and concerns in terms of safety for 
themselves, patients and families.
We don't have clinics in our area, only hospitals. 
There is no safe place for clinics. Hospitals are forti-
fied and people go there… SU5
Participants described personal safety as a priority for 
health-workers, as unless they were safe they could not 
save others’ lives. Similarly worries about family members’ 
safety were a major distraction that reduced their effec-
tiveness. Participants reported that assurances about their 
family’s safety were crucial for them to focus on their 
professional duties. Many Aleppo participants reported 
their families were outside the siege, but relatives and 
friends were inside, while most Ghouta participants’ fami-
lies were inside.
This was a major reason for us to endure, that you 
secure for your family a safe place outside the country 
[…]. You feel comfortable while you are doing your 
duty. SA2
Participants reported not being able to work properly 
whenever their neighbourhoods were bombarded. Some-
times health-workers recognised injured people from 
their neighbourhood and would try to check on their 
families. Many described work as distracting them from 
their concerns, while others said some health-workers 
could not work because they needed to secure their 
families.
There was a serious lack of nurses and everyone was 
so consumed with their family that they could not 
come to work and transport problem would exacer-
bate that. EA5
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Participants described the choices they made to keep 
working in dangerous conditions. For example, Aleppo 
participants said they had known the siege was coming 
and that they were targeted, but chose to stay because 
it was an ‘ethical, religious, humanitarian, and patriotic 
commitment’.
Regardless of my personal opinion, the only reason 
for me to stay in rebel-held areas was […] purely a 
humanitarian motive. EA5
First of all, there was a lack in health-workers. Second, 
the humanitarian factor. Third, this is my city. If 
I did not defend it, how else could I be beneficial? 
Outside? This was my time and the golden time to 
participate. RA6
All participants described health facility attacks as 
a systematic and deliberate war tactic, with hospitals 
targeted multiple times with variety of weapons. What 
most frustrated participants was that perpetrators would 
probably not be held accountable. Hence, all recom-
mended enforcing international humanitarian law.
Your being inside a hospital was more dangerous 
than being a fighter on a frontline […] because you 
are the regime’s enemy more than those who carry 
weapons. NA4
Participants described how the stress they experienced 
influenced their work, for example, not being able to 
come to work or requesting long breaks. All participants 
said their ultimate fear was not being killed but being 
arrested.
We sometimes received threats even from rebels 
themselves, they thought this hospital was only to 
serve them like a five-star hotel. However, this was 
nothing compared to our fear of the regime and that 
it would conquer the area and deal [horribly] with 
prisoners, especially with field execution. That we 
lived with every day. EA5
To handle fear and work pressures, participants 
described occupying themselves with work.
I remember one of our colleagues could not stand 
blood and hard work anymore so he excused himself 
from working and then he had a mental crisis. He was 
waiting for something new to happen. Things were 
only getting worse […] Better to keep working even 
if you are not specialised in what you do. TA8
Others described maintaining a team spirit.
We lived as one family… working like a beehive. AA1
Participants described hope was a key factor that kept 
health-workers working during the siege. Participants 
reported trying to live their life as best they could, main-
taining hope until the end. Most participants expressed 
satisfaction with whatever they had managed to do.
Under these circumstances, if you remember it now, 
you would be surprised how you were living it, but we 
lived […]. Some people [even] got married. TA8
DISCuSSIOn
Primary findings
This exploratory study offers insights into how health-
workers in besieged areas in Syria continued providing 
care despite overwhelming workload, targeting, besiege-
ment and safety fears. This is the first study to examine 
adaptations to siege and targeting in Syria from the 
perspective of Syrians who have remained in their country 
during the conflict to try to relieve suffering. As noted by 
Footer et al, these local health-workers have received far 
less research attention than have international humani-
tarian workers.48 Similar research examines healthcare 
provision in besieged Gaza,41 health and nutrition in 
besieged settings49 50 and health-worker experiences in 
opposition-controlled areas.48
Results suggest health system strengthening implications 
for various actors, for example, facility/programme-man-
agers, researchers and the international community. 
Results described responses to four main challenges. First, 
due to ongoing conflict hospitals frequently received 
more injured than could be treated. Second, facilities, 
staff and patients were at risk from targeted bombings, 
highlighting global non-enforcement of International 
Humanitarian Law. Third, resources were restricted by 
besiegement. Fourth, health-workers had to remain func-
tional and resilient, despite overwhelming stresses and 
fears for their own and others’ safety. Health-workers thus 
had to adapt to cope with mass casualties, try to protect 
themselves, their patients and their families from attacks, 
and mitigate resource constraints, all while maintaining 
their own psychological resilience.
responses to conflict
Managing mass casualties requires rapidly removing casu-
alties from the hazardous scene and reducing mortality in 
facilities.51 While the former relies on pre-hospital activ-
ities, the latter is usually achieved through triage.52 After 
air strikes, participants’ hospitals were overwhelmed with 
casualties and health-workers relied on triage. Despite not 
having needed it prior to conflict, when only emergency 
doctors trained in triage, besieged health-workers empha-
sised its importance in reducing mortality and the value 
of triage training they received, supporting the concept of 
casualty flow in disasters proposed by Frykberg.52 Mehta 
and others describe issues to consider in mass casualty 
events, including altered standards and legal and ethical 
bases for allocating scarce resources.53 54
The main difference in conflict responses between 
Aleppo and Ghouta was the greater reliance on on-the-job 
training and task-shifting due to the length of the siege. 
Participants in both areas recommended training for 
all health-workers in triage and war-related trauma and 
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injuries management. Thus, lessons for healthcare during 
conflict include ensuring all health-workers are trained in 
triage, managing war-related traumas and personal safety. 
Facility and NGO managers should consider findings 
in stocking contingency kits with consumables used in 
emergency departments to stabilise injuries and reduce 
mortality, and updating preparedness/security plans, to 
ensure optimal use of health-workers and resources.
responses to targeting
Health-workers described health facility attacks as a 
systematic war tactic due to failure to enforce inter-
national humanitarian law. Our findings were similar 
to those described by Fouad et al as ‘weaponisation of 
healthcare’, the ‘purposeful use of violence to restrict 
or deny access to healthcare as a strategy of war’.14 
While the term is not widely recognised, it appears 
relevant to our participants’ experiences. Findings also 
partly overlap with International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) recommended protection measures for 
health-workers in conflicts.55 These include formulating 
contingency plans, protecting health facilities, securing 
commodities from looting and organising casualties 
flow. However, ICRC recommendations do not cover 
systematic air strikes against health facilities, and may 
be more appropriate for less severe conflicts. Other 
literature proposes documenting facility attacks more 
reliably and reducing biased self-reports, to discourage 
future perpetrators.18 48 56 We found a gap in the health 
literature regarding evidence on operational protective 
measures, possibly due to the challenges in conducting 
such research, and more could be learnt from the mili-
tary medical literature. Literature on effective means 
of enforcing International Humanitarian Law and 
enhancing accountability was also lacking.
The main difference in responses to targeting between 
Aleppo and Ghouta was the reliance on dispersed health 
facility structures in Ghouta. Lessons for other settings 
include fortifying key facility areas, reducing facility visi-
bility, dispersal of personnel and resources and working 
underground in areas less likely to be gassed. While better 
protection mechanisms are arguably a practical necessity, 
all parties in the Syrian conflict and other conflicts should 
work to lift all forms of siege and collective punishment of 
civilians as required by international law and UN Security 
Council resolutions 2165 and 2191 in compliance with 
international humanitarian law prohibiting attacks on 
healthcare. UN agencies and international actors must 
continue to advocate for the protection of health-workers 
and civilians during conflicts and better mechanisms for 
implementing international law and UN Security Council 
Resolutions. Advocacy and human rights actors should 
continue to advocate strongly for better and monitored 
implementation of International Humanitarian Law and 
UN Security Council Resolution 2286, which obliges 
signatory nations to avoid targeting medical and health-
care personnel.
responses to besiegement
Reported besiegement responses were notably different 
between Aleppo and Ghouta, as the first was a short-term 
siege for which health-workers were able to make some 
preparations (eg, stockpiling, resource conservation) 
while the protracted nature of the Ghouta siege required 
particularly inventive responses (eg, smuggling, local 
production, establishment of a medical school). Poten-
tial lessons for facility preparedness and health-worker 
safety planning include considering field hospitals having 
more than one underground floor, fortification of visible 
external areas, shelter for health-workers to rest, a secure 
generator with a sustainable fuel supply and accessible 
anti-chemical warfare equipment and fire extinguishers. 
Where feasible, facilities and resources can be dispersed 
over wider geographical areas to reduce severe losses of 
health-workers and equipment.
responses to chronic risk
Results contribute to the literature on how health-workers 
persevere in dangerous working and living conditions. 
As in other publications, participants described serious 
violations of the sanctity of health by combatants during 
the conflict.14 48 Key aspects health-workers reported as 
strengthening their ability to cope were knowing their 
families were safe, feeling valued and part of a team, 
appreciating the everyday joys in life and finding ways to 
maintain hope. Lessons for agencies supporting health-
workers in similarly dangerous and challenging settings 
include helping families move from heavily conflict-af-
fected areas, maintaining communication with health-
workers and providing any requested support that is 
feasible.
research needs
Study findings can help in generating hypotheses for 
future research. The lack of preparedness and manage-
ment plans described by participants may have resulted 
from lack of evidence in addressing mass civilian casualty 
events during conflicts and targeted siege. Health security 
research is needed to provide evidence for preparedness 
and protection plans, including health facility protec-
tion approaches against different weaponry, alternative 
power sources, reusable supplies and low-tech and/
or more energy-efficient equipment. Health services 
research is needed to help doctors determine the extent 
to which they can alter standards and potential conse-
quences. Since research during conflict is hindered by 
security and poor access, simulation techniques could 
provide useful estimations and inferences. Health policy 
and systems research is needed to improve accountability 
and protection such as improving documentation and 
evidence production from conflict-affected areas and 
identifying ways to address the political elements neces-
sary for effective enforcement of International Human-
itarian Law.
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limitations
Two particular limitations should be considered due to 
time constraints, confidentiality concerns and access 
issues and inferences about best practices during siege 
should only be made fcautiously. First, restricted topics 
and snowball sampling could have reduced the perspec-
tives included (eg, women did not participate, and 
Ghouta participants were under-represented, due to 
confidentiality concerns and internet availability). Rela-
tively fewer women health-workers worked in besieged 
areas and those who did were less willing than their male 
counterparts to participate in research, due to expressed 
concerns about safety and confidentiality. Potential ways 
to address this in future research include lengthening 
the data collection period to allow more time to gain the 
confidence of potential participants, including at least 
one woman interviewer, and oversampling women health-
workers. Second, reporting bias is possible. Interviewers 
were Syrians familiar with the socio-political context, 
which facilitated participant contact and discussion, but 
could have introduced social desirability and cultural 
familiarity biases (eg, particularly motivation-to-stay 
responses) and assumptions about interviewer neutrality. 
Interviewers speaking the same dialect as participants 
allowed opportunities to interrogate meanings and inter-
pretations, though Twine argues that being different can 
also stimulate communication.57
COnCluSIOnS
While siege settings differ, depending on length 
and severity of attacks against healthcare, common 
approaches may be used to mitigate challenges. Besieged 
health-workers were most affected by severe resource 
constraints and safety concerns while responding 
to overwhelming mass casualty events. Lessons for 
besiegement planning included consideration of capa-
bilities to: (i) respond to conflict through in-person/
online health-worker training, for example, in triage, 
low-technology equipment and resource conservation, 
emergency response and task-shifting; (ii) mitigate 
targeting through facility security, for example, protec-
tion and deterrence through fortification, working 
underground and reducing visibility; (iii) manage 
besiegement through ensuring internet and electricity 
access; low-technology/reusable equipment; securely 
stockpiling fuel, medicines and supplies; and estab-
lishing alternative supply routes; and (iv) cope mentally, 
through feeling supported and valued despite extremely 
difficult circumstances.
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